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BRIEF OF APPELLEE DAVID D. BENNETT
This is an appeal from the decision of The Third Judicial District Court, Hon.
Glenn K. Iwasaki presiding, dismissing the complaint of plaintiff appellant with prejudice
and ordering the suppression of purported changes to sworn deposition testimony of
plaintiff/appellant.
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the Trial Court correctly exercise its discretion in dismissing the

plaintiffs complaint with prejudice?
The standard of review is abuse of discretion State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932
(Utah 1994); Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange. 860 P.2d 937 (Utah 1993). (Hereinafter
"Crookston IF').
2.

Did the Trial Court err in granting Appellees' motions to suppress

substantive changes made by appellant to her deposition testimony?
The standard of review is correctness. Trujillo v. Jenkins, 840 P.2d 777 (Utah
1992)
3.

The errors claimed by appellant do not affect the substantial rights of the

parties and must be ignored as harmless pursuant to Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The standard of review for whether any error of the trial court affected the
substantial rights of a party is whether without the error there would have been a different
-1-

result. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 796 (Utah 1991V (Hereinafter
"Crookston I").
The test of whether substantial rights are affected is whether or not correction of
any error would change the result. Scudder v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 886 P.2d 48,
(Utah 1995).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES. PROVISIONS. RULES AND ORDINANCES
The following Rules relate to the issues raised in this appeal:
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2¥j): Court of Appeals jurisdiction. The Court
of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory
appeals over:...(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the
Supreme Court.
Rule 30fe\ Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: Depositions upon oral
examination. Submission to witness; changes; signing. If requested by the
deponent or a party before completion of the deposition, the deponent shall
have 30 days after being notified by the officer that the transcript or
recording is available in which to review the transcript or recording and, if
there are changes in form or substance, to sign a statement reciting such
changes and the reasons given by the deponent for making them. The
officer shall indicate in the certificate prescribed by subdivision (f)(1)
whether any review was requested and, if so, shall append any changes
made by the deponent during the period allowed.
Rule 41(a¥2¥iD. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: Dismissal of Actions. By
order of the court (An action may only be dismissed by plaintiff.) [U]pon
such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has
been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs
motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's
objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independent
adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a
dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice.
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Rule 6L Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: No error in either the admission or
the exclusion of evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in
anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties, is ground for
granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless
refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial
justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error
or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of
the parties.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case was filed August 5, 1999, by the lawfirm of Robert J. DeBry &
Associates, purportedly on behalf of Connie Albrecht individually, and on behalf of
certain unnamed women, as a class representative.1 R.l

1

That Complaint (R.l-11) arguably is a sham and appears as an in terrorem
responseby Robert DeBry to ^Motion by Co-Counselof RecordRespecting Plaintiffs 'Final
Report ofSettlement filed July 22,1999 by co-counsel Wallace Bennett and David Bennett
in an ongoing Utah federal court matter [2:92-CV-0889]. By that Complaint, Robert DeBry
sought an injunctive Stay of those federal court proceedings [Connie Albrecht v. McGhan
Medical Corp.. et all: and "For general damages in the sum of $20,000 per class member"
(for "common law fraud" of "200-500 persons"); and "for global damages in the sum of
$250,000". R. 1-11. Mr. DeBry's response was a reaction to the following motion which
had been filed in federal court in a pending case:
Two co-counsel of record for the plaintiff women herein feel it incumbent to
move that lead plaintiff counsel Robert J. DeBry and his administrative staff,
Robert J. DeBry and Associates, report to the court the amount that each client
received by way of her settlement and the related costs and attorneys fees
charged. The Court should apply whatever conditions of confidentiality as
may be deemed appropriate. Such trust account report would be consistent
with the Trust Account Certification executed by attorneys under Rule 1.15
of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar.
That there should be a judicial review of the reasonableness of legal fees and of justifiable
expenses in case dismissals is clear: Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and In
the matter of WICAT. 671 F.Supp. 726 (D.Utah 1987).
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Albrecht claimed, inter alia, that Wallace R. Bennett and David D. Bennett had
wioiigjulk tiial ai'Liiii pleadings in prikling ledcial L-»^^ "

I iiiy hiuist iiii|ilLtiil" iiijull

thereby delayed settlement of her personal injury cases. R.
On the day the complaint was filed in this case, the DeBry firm attached a copy of
t h e C o m p l a i n t li

i i i i u i i u i d i i d m i i I I I L J i n ii I U I L ' I . J I I ni ii

I Ik l i J C I l i O i a i i d l l i i i \\\\\ i it ml MI

motion file :*

T Hennetts asking the federal court to review the fees and costs being

charged by the DeBry firm to clients who were jointly represented by the Bennetts and
the DeBry firm See I hird Pai t> Complaint, R.82 at 1flj132 3 4. ' I he DeBry firm told the

the state court in the in:

* case. Id. at ff 132-136.

Believing that the instant case was filed by the DeBry firm to further its own

thai the rea1 w

i interest was not Connie Albrecht, but ft as Roberi J. Ocii.j *uA~ „.M

lav firm R 1 > ^
At oral argument on the motion lo dbfULiS, Kubul J Uclii> digued vi^mousl1,
t

md the clnss of women she purported to represent had been seriously

damaged, and the case should move forward.
At the time the instant case was filed, Robert J. DeBry w a^ repi•J^IAU^ * )c *
Hcnnrll in in 'illi "ni mini nihil 1 In mi "•iii'ii mini inn or and u in in support ot motion to disqualify counsel.
R.272-276.
•' . David D. Bennett filed a motion to disqualify Robcit J, DeBry and the UeBr) lirm
tnmi icpt'esenliiig Connie i1 > Ihri \ lull in illini uisLinl i iisi" din• Ii i m nilllin I mil iiiitf irsl .mil
•

'

'•

• " . • •

••

ill

violation of the code of Professional Responsibility. See R. 264-271. The matter was
briefed and was argued on January 31, 2000. R.601. On February 9, 2000, the trial court
entered its memorandum decision granting the motion of David D. Bennett to disqualify
Robert J. DeBry and the firm of Robert J. DeBry & Associates as counsel for plaintiffs in
the instant case. The Court held "[T]he representation by DeBry & Associates of plaintiff
herein is a blatant violation of Rule 1.7." See R 620-625.
Following the disqualification of the DeBry firm, the case was referred to attorney
Phillip B. Shell, by the DeBry firm. Deposition of Connie Albrecht R.1047 at P. 48.
On April 6, 2000, one day before her scheduled deposition, Connie Albrecht filed
a motion to dismiss. R.673. Her deposition went ahead on April 7, 2000. R.1047.
Immediately following the deposition, counsel for defendants Wallace Bennett
and David Bennett filed motions to have the dismissal be with prejudice, if granted.
R.704, 700. Defendants also filed motions for summary judgment on April 12,2000,
based upon Albrecht's deposition wherein she stated she was unaware she had been a
named plaintiff in this case prior to the disqualification of the DeBry firm; that she had
suffered no damages at the hands of the Bennetts; and, that she had no interest in
pursuing a case against the Bennetts. See R. 679-687.
Following the filing of motions for summary judgment by defendants (R 679),
Connie Albrecht attempted to change her deposition testimony. The changes were filed
by the court reporter two days after Albrecht filed a memorandum in opposition to
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. R 728; 748.
Defendants filed a motion to strike or suppress the changes. R 766-776.
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On June 26, 2000, the Court heard argument on the motion to strike and the
motion lo disnii ^

11 I IM8.

On July 17, 2000, the Court entered its order granting the motion of David Bennett
to strike or suppress the substantial changes to the deposition testimony of Connie
Albicchl, and di missed the case with prejudice. R.JUid 1()>K,
STATEMENT O F FACTS
Uii February 18, 1992, a letter Agreement initially established a joint-ventuic
partnership among a consortium ot lawyers consisting of Robert DeBry, Frank L. Moss
D h i n t Will'nun

>\'ilh r hl llniiirN

mil M n id 1 i Bniiirlt ( hticinaffn trfniip I In ,is

the "BI Team"). Later, Samuel J. Thurmond joined the itaiii and paiiicipated until he
formally withdrew in January of 1994. R. 82421 and 122-22?
represented I 11 li mimii I mi i I nil tunm

III

Ths BI Team

mil li! I I i Ih IIIII.i^ n ill! IIIII mil mimimii I ih IIIIIIIIJI asr in stale

and federal courts over an extended period of time beginning in 1992. Id. at ]\ 33-34.
Under the Agreement, the BI Team members were each obligated to appear as
"attorneys of record" on each and every silicone implant I uiii|)Liiiil till ill in bulli lech ni ill
and > ilitr Court

inn lulling < immi Minn hi i MrGh.in I 11 III ill ( ii|i ( \isi "hJri

CV-0889, U.S. District court for the District of Utah, Central 11

1

I1

i in ("Aibrci hi v.

McGhau I Mill mil ill other appearances of record in over 20 federal and state cases by
each 111 Train iiiinnhn w r-

IIIII

iitvoi mtinn nl

niii|ili.iiii r \Mtli iiinl fiiiiillllii i inn nf Ih ill

Agreement, indeed, the original letter Agreement incorporated the subsequent courst uf
conduct which evolved over years of time (hereinafter referred to as the "Agreement").

u

The responsibilities of the BI Team for the joint-representation of each and every
silicone implant claimant under the Agreement established an attorney-client relationship
with each and every silicone implant claimant, including those hundreds of women for
which each BI Team member appeared as attorney of record.
The administrative aspects of the representation were handled by Robert J. DeBry,
a member of the Team, and his firm, Robert J. DeBry & Associates.
In June of 1999, Mr. DeBry sent a letter to members of the Team purporting to
dissolve the Team and make a minimal payment to Team members. Ex. A to Third Party
Complaint. R.122. As a result of the efforts of DeBry to dissolve the Team, questions
arose regarding the division of attorneys fees collected by DeBry. David Bennett had
appeared as counsel in all cases filed in state and federal court. R 34 atffif29-34.
In the summer of 1999, David Bennett and his father, Wallace R. Bennett,
received notice that certain of the cases filed in federal court, and which had been
subsumed into a worldwide class action administered by a federal judge in Alabama
(MDL case No. 926), were to be returned to their original courts for disposition. See Ex
M to Third Party Complaint, R.122.
One of these cases was Connie Albrecht et. al. v. McGhan Medical Corp.. et. al.
(No. 92-CV-889) filed in the United States District Court for the District of Utah. ("The
Albrecht Case."). See Third Party Complaint, R.82 at ^ 119.
The Bennetts filed a motion in the Albrecht case seeking review by the Court of
the fees and costs charged by the DeBry firm. Id. at <(|129.
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On August 5, 1999, the complaint in this case was filed, ™
KUIH.II

1

On the same day,

.1, DeBi , llliiai i\ icspunsr In lliu IU'IMKIII nmi nn HI ||H \JIHQ lul uise < hull

claimed, inter alia, that there was no need ior me federal court to review the fees and
costs because they would be resolved in this case.2 R. 132-136.
The DeBry firm vigorously resisted efforts of the defendant

J

the ca se dismissed. (R I(); '/ 5). ::: i t ::i obtain discover/ u ^2^.
At the time this case was filed. Robert J i )-/Br\ \\ as counsel for David D Bennett
in another case penuiiiL :

,rd District Coun in :>aii Lake Count}' h _ _-_ £
- :\v\ hiiil hnviched his dnlv :is h

Because I

* il 1).

Bennett moved the Court to disqualify DeBry and his firm from representing Connie
Albrecht in this case Id

wherein it granted the motion to disqualify' Robert J. DeBry and his fii in fi oni
representing plaintiffs in this case. The trial coun foui
Assoei;^.

. putintn: lica-... isablataii. .ioiauoi ,.:-.. .

]

presentation by DeBry &
.

- S.

- isqualification of the DeBn II nn in this case, counsel lor David

Bennett sent nonce to anDeiiant to appoint counsel. R.626. Her receipt of the notice to
•appoint counsel was vn^ nK>t nonce appell.uil li.id Ihat she was the named plaintiff in this

:

. .i v en the subsequent history of this case, a strong inference arises that this
case was filed ^ ahout the knowledge or consent of Connie Albrecht, for the express
purpose of bolstering the efforts of Robert J. DeBry to avoid disclosing to the Court, in the
Albrecht case, the amount of fees and costs being charged to the breast implant clients.
-8

case. Deposition of Connie Albrecht, R.1047 at pp. 6, 9-11, 16-17, 21, 54-55.
(Hereinafter "Depo. at

").

Upon finding she was a named plaintiff, and was responsible for the case, Connie
Albrecht was referred to new counsel by the DeBry firm. Depo at 55. Once new counsel
had appeared, Ms. Albrecht moved the court to dismiss her case on the day prior to her
scheduled deposition on April 7, 2000. R.673.
On April 7, 2000 Connie Albrecht appeared at her deposition. During her
deposition, she denied giving the DeBry firm authorization to file this action against the
Bennetts. (Depo. at page 16, line 25; page 17, lines 5,6; page 22, line 12). She also stated
that she first knew about the action only a few months before the deposition. R.1047
(Depo. at page 17, lines 8-10).
Following the deposition of Connie Albrecht on April 7, 2000, defendants filed for
summary judgment (R.679), based upon the admissions of Ms. Albrecht that she had not
authorized the suit and had not been damaged. See Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment. R.682-687.
Ms. Albrecht filed her response to the summary judgment motions on April 24,
2000, (R.728), and two days later she also filed changes to her sworn deposition
testimony. R.748. Defendants moved to strike or suppress the changes arguing they
were made for the obvious purpose of attempting to avoid a well taken Motion for
Summary Judgment. See memo in support of motion to strike. R.769-776. Defendants
also responded to the motion of plaintiff to dismiss under Rule 41 by requesting that the
dismissal be with prejudice. R.700; 704.
-9-

The motions to dismiss and to strike were argued to the court on June 26, 2000.
I
On July • "". 2000 the court entered its order dismissing the case with prejudice,
and granting the motion to strike, R, 10 S6

suiviiviAm ii > I" "i "Hi"1: /"»i 1111:1;

H I M TINT

1•on J11
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN
k
Wh

rrrcir^ COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE
'

*

.MUSS

Ihi Ii ii'iiil uuii'l hiii hi

nil disc irlinn in

determine whether th~ ^ x ^ s s a l should be with or without prejudice. Murray First. Thrift.
& Loan Co. v. Benson, 563 P.2d 185 (Utah 1 9 ^ 1 To warrant a reversal of the
com f s dismissal \ v ith prejudi :e in this -- „, .;.-: v ;.,-

T

- ...

arbitrary or capricious. Kunzler v, O'Dci . 855 P.2d 270, 275 (Ulan App.

...n^

L'^J).

A trial judge is best able to evaluate the status of a case and. the attitudes, motives
aiiu v • vuiUmi; »•* ^iiv

*. L on t men la

•* ; ' - J

i

1997).
The defendants in this case had expended considerable time and expense to bring
the case to the point, wiiere the court was ready to decide a Summary Judgment Motion.
Tin In,ill four! elk Ui ill In iII.MIni;s with |>U'|iuluv 1'vnu ii upuii lilt1 (ttisluii ul (he i JISC .iiinlll in
fairness to the parties. The facts in the present case are sufficiently similar to those in
Murray First Thrift & Loan Co. v. Benson, supra, so as to put the decision of whether to
disn

facts in Murray First Thrift & Loan Co. v. Benson, supra, the appellant has failed to show
any abuse of discretion.
In ruling, the trial court was familiar with the history of the case, and knew the
positions of the parties, and had watched portions of the videotaped deposition of the
plaintiff. It properly exercised its discretion in dismissing with prejudice. Murray First
Thrift & Loan Co. v. Benson, supra: Kunzler v. O'Dell. supra: Morton v. Continental
Banking Co.. supra.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S
ATTEMPT TO CHANGE SUBSTANTIVE ANSWERS GIVEN IN
SWORN DEPOSITION TESTIMONY WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED.
Plaintiff gave her deposition on April 7, 2000. On April 12, 2000 defendants
moved for summary judgment. On April 24, 2000, plaintiff attempted to make numerous
substantive changes to her deposition testimony. It was an obvious attempt to create a
factual issue which would defeat the pending summary judgment motion.
Plaintiff did not follow the mandate of U.R.C.P. 30(e) in making the changes (a
fact admitted in plaintiffs response to the motion to suppress the changes. R.833.) That
failure is sufficient to uphold the trial court's suppression of the changes. Gaw v. State,
798 P.2dl 130, 1140 (Utah App. 1990). The Gaw case recognized that in a proper factual
setting, substantial changes to testimony might properly be suppressed. Id. at 1139,
citing Barlow v. Esselte Pendaflex Corp.. 111 F.R.D. 404 (M.D.N.C. 1986). A growing
number of courts have held that a deposition is not a take home exam which allows any
-11-

answer to be changed to suit the theory of the case. Greenway v. International Paper Co.,
144 F.R.D. 322 (W.D. La. 1992); Wilev v. Brown. 164 F.R.D. 547 (D. Kan. 1996).
The purpose of discovery is to allow the facts to be determined to allow an
efficient, quick and fair resolution of the dispute. Ellis v. Gilbert. 19 Utah 2d 189, 190,
429 P.2d 39 (1967). Allowing wholesale substantive changes to a deposition after a
summary judgment motion is filed defeats that purpose, and such changes should not be
allowed. Greenway. supra: Rios v. Welch. 856 F. Supp. 1499 (D. Kan. 1994); Thorn v.
Sundstrand Aerospace Corp.. 207 F.3d 383 (7th Cir. 2000). For these reasons, the court
properly suppressed the changes to plaintiffs sworn deposition testimony.
POINT III
THE ERRORS COMPLAINED OF BY APPELLANT ARE HARMLESS
Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires this Court to disregard any error
of the trial court unless substantial rights are affected. Reversal requires a substantial and
prejudicial error which affected the outcome of the case. Scudder v. Kennecott Copper
Corp.. supra; Crookston L supra at 796.
If a reversal won't change the outcome in the lower court, the error is harmless.
Scudder. supra: Tingev v. Christensen. 987 P.2d 588, 592 (Utah 1999).
Regardless of how this Court rules on the dismissal, the case will still be over. A
reversal of the order suppressing the deposition changes will not affect the result in this
case (dismissal). Therefore, even if the order suppressing the changes was in error, it was
harmless, and Rule 61 prevents reversal.
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The only reason given by appellant for reversing the dismissal with prejudice is
that if defendants cause her to violate her settlement agreement by disclosing the fees
paid or amounts she received, she may want to sue. See Appellants Brief at Point I.
Obviously, if a future act of defendants harms the appellant, she will have a new cause of
action, and can sue whether or not this case was dismissed with prejudice.
Appellant has totally failed to show that the dismissal with prejudice in this case
affected substantial rights as required by Rule 61. Even if the Court erred in dismissing
with prejudice, the error was harmless. Scudder, supra: Crookston L supra: Tingey.
supra.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN
DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE
The plaintiff/Appellant moved to dismiss her complaint pursuant to Rule
41(a)(2)(H) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. She simply asked for "an order
dismissing her case against defendants," and did not specify "with or without prejudice."
She said the reason for filing the case was "essentially moot." See Motion to Dismiss,
R.673.
Because of the time and expense involved in the case, and the fact defendants felt
the case was ripe for summary judgment, Defendants/Appellees concurred in the Motion
to Dismiss on the condition the case be dismissed with prejudice. R.700;704. The trial

-13-

court considered the history of the case, and the positions of the parties, and exercised its
discretion by dismissing with prejudice. R.1056.
The motion to dismiss was filed one day prior to the plaintiffs deposition on April
7, 2000. R.673. Immediately following her deposition, David Bennett filed a motion for
summary judgment. R.679. The motion was ripe for decision and ready to argue when
the Court dismissed the case with prejudice, pursuant to the plaintiffs April 6, 2000
motion.
Connie Albrecht wants this Court to reverse the dismissal with prejudice, and to
remand with instructions to dismiss the case without prejudice. She concedes in her brief
that she must convince this Court that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing
with prejudice. However, she has failed to meet her burden.
Reversal of the lower court's decision requires a showing of abuse of discretion.
See appellant Brief at 3 "The standard of review is whether the Trial Court abused its
discretion.
To show an abuse of discretion, appellant must show that there was no reasonable
basis for the decision. State v. Pena. supra: Crookston II supra at 936-939.
A reversal of a discretionary ruling by a trial judge will occur only if the ruling:
[I]s so unreasonable that it can be classified as arbitrary and capricious or a
clear abuse of discretion. Kunzlerv. O'DelL supra at 275; See Ames v.
Maas, 846 P.2d 468,476 (Utah App. 1993).
A trial court has great latitude in making a determination as to what is the most
fair and efficient manner to conduct its business and deal with the cases presented to it
for decision. In Morton v. Continental Baking Co., supra, the Court stated:
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The trial judge is in the best position to evaluate the status of his cases, as
well as the attitudes, motives and credibility of the parties. Id at 275.
This lawsuit was commenced on August 5, 1999. Defendant Wallace Bennett
filed a motion to dismiss (R. 15) that was vehemently opposed by the plaintiff. The
motion was denied. (R.620). Discovery was performed and the deposition of plaintiff
was taken R. 1047.
Immediately following the plaintiffs deposition on April 7, 2000, defendants filed
a motion for summary judgment. R.679. The motion was opposed. R.728.
At the hearing on plaintiffs motion to dismiss, defendants argued the dismissal
should be with prejudice. They similarly argued in their memorandum in response to the
plaintiffs motion to dismiss. R.704.
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, plaintiffs videotaped deposition was
published. R.1048. Excerpts from the deposition were shown to the trial court. Based
upon the arguments, memoranda and deposition of plaintiff, the court exercised its
discretion and dismissed with prejudice. Having heard the arguments and being familiar
with the parties, issues and history of the case, the trial court was certainly in the best
position to make a ruling on the question of whether dismissal should be with or without
prejudice. See Morton, supra: Crookston IL supra.
Rule 41 does not grant an absolute right to a dismissal without prejudice. The rule
allows the trial judge discretion to decide what is best under the circumstances of the
case. The court determined the equities to be in favor of dismissing with prejudice. The
trial court said:
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Where the defense is ready to proceed and wishes to proceed to a
conclusion on the merits, it is proper to attach the condition that the
dismissal be with prejudice when the plaintiff seeks to voluntarily dismiss
under Rule 41. (R. 1050)
Such a ruling is certainly reasonable. In Murray First Thrift & Loan Co. v.
Benson, supra, the Utah Supreme Court upheld just such a discretionary ruling.
Appellant would distinguish Murray First Thrift & Loan Co. v. Benson because
the trial was in progress when the plaintiff asked for a voluntary dismissal. However,
that is a distinction without a difference. The precedential value of the Murray First
Thrift case is the Supreme Court's ruling that the trial court had discretion, and then
properly exercised that discretion in dismissing with prejudice. The trial court properly
exercised its discretion in this case and the ruling should be upheld.
There are significant similarities between the present case and the Murray First
Thrift case. As Judge Iwasaki noted in his ruling, this case had been vigorously
defended. Both defendants were ready to proceed on motions for summary judgment.
Based upon on its knowledge of the case history and status, the court properly exercised
its discretion and dismissed with prejudice. (R. 1050). See Murray First Thrift & Loan
Co. v. Benson, supra: Morton v. Continental Baking Co.. supra.
This is essentially the same conclusion reached by the trial judge in Murray First
Thrift, (i.e. The facts and history of the case warranted dismissal with prejudice). The
similarities between the present case and Murray First Thrift & Loan Co. v. Benson.
supra are such that it is clear the judges in both cases acted properly within their broad
discretion. They could best evaluate the status of the case before them and the attitudes,
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motives and credibility of the witnesses. See Morton v. Continental Banking Co.. supra.
No reasonable mind can say with confidence that the trial court's decision was "so
unreasonable that it can be classified as arbitrary or capricious." See Kunzlerv. O'DelL
supra.
Appellant admits damages were de minimis. There was a real dispute as to
whether they existed at all. Appellant testified she wanted the case dismissed because
damages were non-existent. The only reason given by counsel for wanting dismissal
without prejudice was the possibility appellant might be damaged by a future act of the
defendants. That fails to provide a reasonable legal basis for dismissal without prejudice.
Appellant would have a new cause of action if harmed by a future act of defendants.
The trial court was familiar with the case history, the positions of the parties, the
deposition testimony of Connie Albrecht, and the equities of the case. Having given
reasoned consideration to the very items specified by the Supreme Court in Morton to be
best evaluated by the trial judge, a dismissal with prejudice was appropriate.
Appellant has failed to meet the burden of showing abuse of discretion as
articulated in Crookston II. supra; and Kunzler, supra.
The trial court's ruling was neither arbitrary nor capricious. It cannot reasonably
be said there was no reasonable basis for the trial court's decision. As the court did in
Murray First Thrift & Loan Co. v. Benson, supra, this Court should rule that the trial
court properly acted within its discretion in dismissing the case with prejudice.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT PLAINTIFF'S ATTEMPT TO
CHANGE SUBSTANTIVE ANSWERS GIVEN IN SWORN DEPOSITION
TESTIMONY WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED.
On April 7, 2000 a video deposition of the plaintiff, Connie Albrecht, was taken
by defendant David Bennett. On April 12, 2000, defendants filed a joint motion for
summary judgment. R.679.
On April 26, 2000 a correction sheet was filed by the Court Reporter which
purported to change the sworn testimony of Ms. Albrecht. A blank correction sheet was
given to Ms. Albrecht after the April 7,2000 deposition. R.748. Connie Albrecht made
changes on the correction sheet, and returned it to the reporter who filed the sheets.
R.748.
The bulk of the changes were substantive in nature. Representative examples of
the substantive changes are set out below.
Q.

Did you authorize Mr. DeBry's office to file a law suit against the

Bennetts?
A.

No, it was not. It was that they, [DeBrys] had confronted me if I

would be - - if they needed me, is my understanding, would I be kind of a
witness for them in their behalf, but as far as my name being the plaintiff, I
about fell through the floor when I seen it.
Proposed new answer:
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I authorized Mr. DeBry's office to represent me and take care of whatever
needed to be done regarding the Bennetts due to legal actions they took on
July 22,1999 in connection with my implant case, although I did not know
all the details.
Q.

You did not give approval for that, did you?
A.

Not to ~ no, to be a plaintiff, no, I did not.

Proposed new answer:
I wasn't aware of what legal actions Mr. DeBry's office was going to take,
but in August of 1999,1 authorized any legal action that they felt necessary.
Depo. at R.1047 at pp 16, In 23 -17, In 7.
Q.

Thank you. Did they [DeBrys] ever tell you that your settlement with the
breast implant cases was being compromised by the Bennetts?

A.

No.

Proposed new answer:
Yes. [instead of no.] I understood back then that their actions could delay or
hurt my case. That's why I authorized Mr. DeBry's firm to represent me
against the Bennetts.
Depo at 17, In 11-14.
Q.

Was that conversation within the last three months.

A.

Uh-huh.

Proposed new answer:
It was in August of 1999 (8 months prior).
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Q.

Surely it was after the first of this year (2000)?

A.

Uh-huh.

Proposed new answer:
No.
Depo at pp 17, In 24-18, In 3.
Q.

As you've reviewed it, (Ex. 1 - The Complaint filed against David Bennett)
can you tell me if anything in there is something that you authorized Mr.
DeBry's office to do?

A.

No.

Proposed new answer:
Answer should be yes, although I didn't understand the extent of what was
being done by my attorney's [sic].
Depo P. 21, In 18-21.
Q.

If you were asked today to endorse or approve this document [Ex. 1, the
Complaint], what would you say?

A.

I would say definitely not because I wouldn't even know what I was talking
about.

Proposed new answer:
Answer should be I relied on my attorney's [sic] and for that reason I
accept.
Depo at P. 22, In 1-4.
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Q.

Would it be a fair statement to say it was filed without your knowledge and
permission?

A.

Yes.

Proposed new answer:
Answer should be no in that I did authorize my attorneys to act in this
matter, although I didn't understand the technicalities.
Depo at P. 22, In 10-12.
Q.

Okay. Did you know you'd asked Mr. Bennett to step down as your
attorney?

A.

No, I didn't. I didn't even know he was there.

Proposed new answer:
I just didn't remember.
Depo at P. 28, In 24-29, In 1.
Q.

Was it [class action settlement plan] ever explained to you?

A.

No.

Proposed new answer:
Yes, it was explained at one time.
Depo at P. 40, In 23-24.
Q.

Do you remember any discussion of what affect [sic] your opting out of a
class action would have on the amount of legal fees you'd paid?

A.

No.

Proposed new answer:
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Answer should be - I might have, but I don't remember now.
DepoatP.45,lnl5-18.
Q.

Did you ever authorize or give permission for that [Ex. 1 - Complaint] to
befiled?

A.

I knew nothing about it.

Proposed new answer:
I didn't authorize it, but I don't understand it. I relied on my attorneys.
Depo at P. 46, In 22-24.
Q.

Was it ever explained to you that if you stayed in the class action and didn't
opt out, that there were benefits that you might receive?

A/

No.

Proposed new answer:
Answer should be a lot of things were explained, but I just don't remember
the details.
DepoatP.47, In 9-12.
Q.

Was your settlement delayed or compromised by the Bennetts?

A.

No.

Proposed new answer:
Answer should be it was delayed but my attorney knows more about the
details.
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Q.

Did anything the Bennetts do [sic] affect - and you may have answered
this before, did anything the Bennetts or either of them do affect the
amount of your settlement?

A.

No,

Proposed new answer:
Answer should be ~ my attorney, Pat, would know more about that.
Depo at P. 69, In 10-17.
On May 1, 2000, defendant David Bennett filed a motion to suppress or strike the
testimonial changes made by Connie Albrecht. R.766.
On July 17, 2000 the Court entered its order dismissing the case with prejudice,
and granting the motion to suppress or strike the deposition changes of Connie Albrecht.
R.1056.
In its memorandum decision of July 3, 2000 (R.1049) the trial court gave its
reason for granting the motion to suppress or strike appellants' purported corrections to
her testimony:
Rule 30(e) was not designed to allow the wholesale alteration of sworn
testimony as attempted by plaintiff in this case. R.1052.
At Point II of her brief, appellant argues that the Court erred in granting the motion. She
claims a deponent has an absolute right under Rule 30(e) to change deposition testimony
in any manner which may be desired.
She relies upon Gaw v. State, supra, for the following propositions:
1.
There are no limits on the number and kinds of changes a deponent
can make; and
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2.

If Rule 30(e) is complied with, any desired changes are permissible.

David Bennett agrees with the second proposition that strict compliance with the
mandatory provisions of Rule 30(e) enables a party to make corrections to deposition
testimony. In this case, appellant did not comply with the mandated procedure of Rule
30(e).
However, appellee does not agree with the proposition that Rule 30(e) allows
unlimited editing of deposition testimony. To allow wholesale changes to sworn
testimony would be counter-productive to the expressed purpose of the discovery rules,
which is to provide for the expeditious resolution of litigation. See e. g. Ellis v. Gilbert
supra. (Discovery Rules were adopted to allow for a simple and efficient method of
determining facts so that cases could be fairly and quickly resolved.)
The Gaw case presented facts similar to those at issue. In Gaw, the Court
observed:
Gaw attempted to change her deposition testimony in over fifty places. She
did so by means of "correction sheets" prepared by herself outside the
presence of the court reporter who took the deposition. The reporter filed
the sheet...some of the changes were merely to clarify and to correct
typographical errors but many were substantive. 798 P.2d 1138.
The trial court granted a Motion to Suppress on the basis of failure to follow the
procedure of Rule 30(e). Id. The Gaw case was, however, decided on a very narrow
issue.
The question at issue in Gaw. as stated by the Court if Appeals, was:
[W]hether the Court should have suppressed the changes for Gaw's failures
to comply with the requirements of Rule 30(e). Rule 30(e) requires that
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changes "be entered upon the deposition by the officer with a statement of
the reasons given by the witness for making them. 798 P.2d at 1139.
In its discussion, the Gaw Court observed that there is authority for some limits on the
changes that can be made to a deposition. Id at 1139, citing Barlow v. Esselte Pendaflex
Corp.. supra. The Gaw Court observed "the facts before us do not warrant the same
remedy reached by the Barlow Court." Id. (Inferring that in a proper case, suppression
of changes may be warranted).
In Gaw. the lower court suppressed the changes made by Mrs. Gaw based solely
on non-compliance with the strict requirements of Rule 30(e). That was the only issue
decided by the Court in Gaw.
The Court of Appeals observed that Gaw had been given an opportunity to comply
with the strict procedure for making changes as set forth in Rule 30(e), but had not done
so, insisting she had a right to make the changes. The case being presented in that
posture, the Court affirmed the suppression of her corrections, based upon her failure to
strictly comply with Rule 30(e). 798 P.2d at 1140.
In the present case, appellant did not comply with the strict requirements of Rule
30(e). That alone should be a sufficient basis for suppressing the changes. Gaw. supra at
1140. Appellant incorrectly attempted to make corrections in the same manner as they
were made by plaintiff in Gaw. In her response to the motion to suppress, appellant
admitted she did not comply with Rule 30(e). R.833.
Appellant was aware of the requirement of strict compliance with Rule 30(e). She
cited Gaw in her memorandum in opposition to the motion to suppress or strike her
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deposition changes. R.833-849. Appellant even went so far as to say that if the Court
thought it necessary, she would strictly comply with Rule 30(e) as required by Gaw. Id.
Having knowledge of the strict compliance mandated by the Gaw decision, and
failing to make any effort to comply prior to moving for dismissal, leaves little room to
claim the trial court erred in suppressing her deposition changes.3
In addition, the trial court observed that Rule 30(e) was not designed to allow
wholesale alteration of sworn testimony. As stated above, the Gaw decision limited itself
to a decision that suppression was appropriate where Rule 30(e) was not satisfied. 798
P.2d at 1139-40. Gaw did not rule on the question of whether, in certain fact situations, a
trial court could properly suppress substantive changes to sworn testimony.
While the Gaw Court in dicta observed that courts have generally not limited the
number and kinds of changes a deponent can make (798 P.2d at 1139), the Court also
noted that the patience of the courts in allowing changes is not boundless Id., citing
Barlow, supra.

3

While the trial court did not suppress the changes to Albrecht's testimony
based upon her failure to strictly comply with Rule 30(e) procedures for making changes,
said failure would certainly provide justification for the suppression of the changes made by
Ms. Albrecht. Ms. Albrecht comes before this court complaining that her changes were not
allowed when, having a knowledge that Gaw had upheld suppression of deposition changes
in a case where the complaining party had not availed herself of the opportunity in the trail
court to attempt compliance with the Rule requirements, she made no attempt to comply with
Rule 30(e) prior to dismissal of her case, but only stated she would comply if the Court
required it of her. R.833 at P 3-4. The holding in Gaw. supra, requires strict compliance
with Rule 30(e). Appellant knew this. Her failure to comply provides an additional reason
for suppressing her changes which reason is sufficient of itself to allow this Court to affirm
the lower court's decision.
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Thus the Court recognized there is some limit to the number of changes, and types
of changes, which can be made by deponents to their sworn testimony.
Gaw was decided in 1990. Since then, a growing number of courts have
recognized that the integrity of the deposition procedure, and the discovery process as a
whole, require some limitation on the right of a deponent to make substantive changes to
sworn testimony. The enlightened thinking requires some limitation on the right of a
deponent to make substantive changes to deposition testimony. The federal courts are
leading this trend, and the Utah courts have long followed the federal precedent on
procedural issues, e. g. Kurth v. Wiarda. 981 P.2d 417,419 (Utah App. 1999).
All courts recognize that the purpose of Rule 30(e) is to allow for correction of
substantive errors made by a court reporter (such as when a witness says "no" — but it is
reported "y es ") or typographical errors, e. g. Gaw. supra; Greenwav v. International
Paper Co.. supra: Wiley v. Brown, supra.
However, the growing trend is not to allow a witness to make major substantive
changes to deposition testimony, particularly after a summary judgment motion has been
filed, e. g. Wiley v. Brown, supra; Rios v. Welch, supra; Greenwav v. International
Paper Co.. supra: Thorn v. Sundstrand Aerospace Corp.. supra.
In the Greenwav case, the Court was presented with a situation identical to what
we have in this case. Excessive changes to the substance of the testimony given at the
deposition were made by the plaintiff. Defendant objected, and claimed Rule 30(e) did
not allow for such substantive changes to the testimony. The trial court agreed, and
granted the motion to suppress the changes.
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In granting the motion to suppress, the Court said:
The purpose of Rule 30(e) is obvious. Should the reporter make a
substantive error, i.e., he reported "Yes" but I said "No," or a formal error,
i.e., he reported the name to be "Lawrence Smith," but the proper name is
"Laurence Smith," then corrections by the deponent would be in order.
The Rule cannot be interpreted to allow one to alter what was said under
oath. If that were the case, one could merely answer the questions with no
thought at all then return home and plan artificial responses. Depositions
differ from interrogatories in that regard. A deposition is not a take home
exam. 144 F.R.D. AT 325.
Reaching the same conclusion, the Court in Rios v. Welch, supra, said:
It is the Court's belief that a plaintiff is not permitted to virtually
rewrite portions of a deposition, particularly after the defendant has filed a
summary judgment motion, simply by invoking the benefits of Rule 30(e).
As the Court stated in its previous order, a deposition is not a "take home
examination" and an errata sheet will not eradicate the import of previous
testimony taken under oath. 856 F. Supp. at 1502.
In this case, Connie Albrecht testified under oath on April 7, 2000. Relying upon
the sworn testimony she gave, defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on April
12,2000. The errata sheets purporting to "correct" the deposition were later signed on
April 24,2000; the same date plaintiff filed her memorandum opposing summary
judgment.
To allow a party, after a motion for summary judgment is filed, to make wholesale
changes in sworn testimony to create the appearance of a factual issue, defeats the very
purpose of discovery.
The whole purpose of discovery is to allow a party to simply and efficiently gather
the facts necessary to effectuate a quick and fair resolution of the case. Ellis v. Gilbert.
supra.
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To allow wholesale changes to sworn deposition testimony, which completely
alter the original testimony, makes the deposition process meaningless. Wiley v. Brown.
supra: Rios v. Welch, supra: Greenway v. International Paper Co.. supra.
Gaw recognized there may be some situations where changes to the substance of a
deponent's testimony should not be allowed. 798 P.2d at 1139. Thus, while the
application of Rule 30(e) is a legal question which this Court reviews for correctness,
some discretion must be allowed to the trial court to consider those factual situations
where changes, if allowed, would defeat the purpose of the Rule. c.f. Jeffs v. Stubbs. 970
P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 1998)(Although legal questions are reviewed for correctness, a
trial court is given discretion in applying the law to a given fact situation.)
In response to a motion for summary judgment, Connie Albrecht attempted to
make wholesale changes to her deposition. The substantive changes completely altered
her testimony regarding her knowledge of the filing of the case by the DeBry law firm,
and her adamant denial of any damages caused by the Bennetts. These changes appear to
have been made for the express purpose of defeating an otherwise well taken motion for
summary judgment.
Where the changes are made after a summary judgment motion is filed, the
reasons for disallowing the changes and granting a motion to suppress are multiplied, e.
g. Franks v. Nimmo. 796 F.2d 1230, 1237 (10th Cir. 1986); Duffy. Lobdell-Emery Mfg.
Co., 926 F. Supp. 799, 804 (N.D. Ind. 1996); Rios v. Welch, supra. Otherwise, the
integrity of the deposition process is undermined, a consideration which is important in
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considering whether such changes should be allowed. cJl Webster v. Sill 675 P.2d
1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983).
The trial court properly exercised its limited discretion on the facts of this case and
suppressed the substantive changes made for the obvious purpose of defeating
defendant's motion for summary judgment. The trial court's ruling should be upheld
either as a correct application of Rule 30(e) to the facts of the case, or because Connie
Albrecht, knowing she had not complied with Rule 30(e) criteria for making changes to
sworn testimony, neglected and failed to take steps to comply with the Rule prior to
dismissal of her case on her own motion.
POINT III
THE ERRORS COMPLAINED OF BY APPELLANT ARE HARMLESS
A.

Background
Appellant, Connie Albrecht, complains of two alleged errors made by the trial

court. First, she claims the case should have been dismissed without prejudice. Second,
she claims the court erred in granting defendants' motion to suppress changes to her
sworn deposition testimony.
Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that at every stage of a
proceeding the court must disregard errors which do not affect the substantial rights of a
party.
In Ashton v. Ashton. 773 P.2d 147 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court referring
to the provisions of Rule 61 stated:
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We have construed this provision as placing upon an appellant the burden
of showing not only that an error occurred, but that it was substantial and
prejudicial... 773 P.2d at 154.
The Utah Supreme Court embraces the general rule that an error will not be corrected on
appeal where the correction of the error will not change the result. As the court stated in
Scudder v. Kennecott Copper Corp.:
To require reversal, error must be substantial and prejudicial in the sense
that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence there would have
been a different result. 886 P.2d at 50 (Citations omitted).
This concept is well established in Utah, and is generally followed in other jurisdictions.
e.g. Crookston L supra at 796; Harline v. Barker. 912 P.2d 433, 442 (Utah 1996);
Matter of S.C.. 869 P.2d 266, 269 (Mont. 1994); Ernst v. Hemenwav and Moser Co..
Inc.. 895 P.2d 581, 587 (Idaho 1995); White v. White. 655 N.E. 2d 523 (Ind. App. 1995).
In Crookston I. supra, our Supreme Court defined harmless error as:
Sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is no reasonable
likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings. 817 P.2d
at 796 (Citations omitted).
The outcome of the proceedings below was dismissal of plaintiff s claims on her
own motion. Granting the relief requested by appellant will not change the result.
Appellant has failed to show reversable error. If there was any error, it was neither
"substantial nor prejudicial."
B.

The Ruling Striking Corrections to the Deposition of Connie Albrecht
Appellant claims the trial court erred in granting the motion of David D. Bennett

to strike the substantive changes Connie Albrecht made to her deposition transcript in an
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effort to avoid summary judgment. Appellant Brief at Point II. On the other hand, David
Bennett thinks the trial court ruled correctly. See Point II. supra.
However, if the trial court erred in granting the motion to strike the changes,
appellant would still not be entitled to a reversal of the trial court's ruling without
showing that (a) the error affected substantial rights; and (b) the outcome of the
proceedings in the lower court would change if the ruling is reversed. Scudder v.
Kennecott Copper Corp.. supra: Harline v. Barker, supra: Ashton v. Ashton. supra:
Tingey v. Christensen. supra.
Appellant has not met her burden. The outcome below was a dismissal with
prejudice. The result below remains the same whether the motion to strike is granted or
denied. The case will still be over. This was the outcome sought by appellant.
When the case was dismissed pursuant to the plaintiffs own motion, the issue of
whether or not she should have been allowed to change her testimony became moot. The
result of her motion to dismiss was the dismissal of her case. Whether or not the court
correctly ruled on the motion to strike the substantive changes, it did not affect the
outcome (i.e., Dismissal at plaintiffs request). Even if this Court reversed on the motion
to strike, the case would still be over. The outcome would remain the same. Since
reversal of the lower courts' ruling would have absolutely no effect on the net result
below, any error which may have occurred in the lower court's decision on the motion to
strike is harmless, e. g. Crookston I. supra, at 796; Scudder v. Kennecott Copper Corp..
supra: Harline v. Barker, supra at 442.
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Because any error that may have occurred had no effect on the outcome of the
case, Rule 61 requires any such error to be ignored. Id.
There is no basis to reverse the ruling because the error, if any, was "harmless."

UC.

Dismissal With Prejudice
The lower court granted plaintiffs motion to dismiss the case pursuant to Rule

41(a)(2)(ii) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The court exercised its discretion and
dismissed with prejudice.
At Point I of her brief, appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
dismissing the case with prejudice. Even though plaintiff failed to state in her original
motion (R.673) that she wanted dismissal "without prejudice", she argues in her brief that
the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing with prejudice. Appellants Brief at
Point I.
David Bennett disagrees, as discussed above in Point I. However, given the
constraints of Rule 61, and the "harmless error" rule, there is a substantial question as to
whether or not the "prejudice" designation should be reversed, even if there was error.
Rule 61 requires that the ruling of a court affect the "substantial rights" of the
party, before the reviewing court can correct an error. The harmless error rule as set out
in Ashton, Crookston I. and Scudder, supra, requires a showing that substantial rights
were affected before a ruling is reversed. The language of Rule 61 requires the ruling be
"substantial and prejudicial" implying there be a substantial prejudice to the party
seeking to overturn the ruling.
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There is no evidence that the appellant was substantially prejudiced by the
dismissal with prejudice, as opposed to without prejudice. Appellant claims the reason
she seeks to overturn the courts dismissal with prejudice is:
The dismissal was requested not because appellant didn't have a
case...Rather it was because the present claim...Had been significantly
reduced.4 [I]t was not deemed worth the court's time and resources to
pursue it. Appellant's brief at ^| 14-15.
It is clear that Connie Albrecht was either not damaged at all (as admitted in her
deposition) or that the damage, was so insignificant as to not warrant pursuing litigation.
The only real basis argued by appellant for dismissing without prejudice is that if, at
some future time, Bennetts' actions force her to breach her confidential settlement
agreement, she may want to pursue a claim for damages resulting therefrom.
That this argument is not a legally sufficient basis to reverse the trial court's
ruling. Any future tortious act gives rise to a new cause of action. The arguments made
by appellant certainly do not carry her burden of showing substantial rights have been
affected, as required by Rule 61.
If a future tortious act occurs, Ms. Albrecht has the right to bring a new suit for
damages based on such act. She has no need to resurrect this case. Appellants'
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It is of interest to note that once the lawfirmof Robert DeBry & Associates
were removed from the case by order of the Court for a "blatant conflict of interest", the
plaintiff was then on her own to pursue the case without the DeBry firm (who defendants
had claimed was the real party in interest). The case was a sham. Plaintiff quickly admitted
she was unaware of the law suit, and did not believe the Bennetts had caused her any
damages. Damages, if any, were de minimus. She wanted the case dismissed. Given these
admissions it appears there was no reason not to dismiss with prejudice.
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unsupported claim that dismissal with prejudice has affected her substantial rights and
was an abuse of discretion simply has no legal merit.
In summary, there has been no showing of any substantial prejudice to appellant
as a result of the Court granting her motion to dismiss and making the dismissal "with
prejudice/'
Having failed to show the substantial prejudice required by Rule 61, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, any error in dismissing plaintiffs complaint with prejudice was
"harmless" under the definitions used by the courts of this state. Scudder v. Kennecott
Copper Corp.. supra: Crookston L supra: Harline v. Barker, supra.
CONCLUSION
The trial court properly exercised its broad discretion to dismiss this case with
prejudice. Under the circumstances, the court acted properly in ruling that the substantial
changes to appellants sworn deposition testimony should be stricken. Appellant failed to
follow the mandate of Rule 30(e), to make changes. In addition, a trial court should have
discretion to prevent wholesale substantive changes to deposition testimony. Finally,
even if the Court erred in striking the corrections, such ruling was harmless given the
dismissal of plaintiff s case.
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Dated this

/ / / d a y of March, 2001.

Mel S. Martin
Attorney for Appellee David D. Bennett
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